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Dear reader
We are proud to launch the third UBS Center Public Paper, 
which focuses on the economics of effective leadership.
While there is a widespread conventional wisdom that leader-
ship is important for the functioning of firms and societies,  
it seems that it was only of minor importance for economists. 
Fortunately, this is changing, as more economic research 
directly studies the inspirational and motivational functions  
of leadership, and how these aspects of leaders can influence 
firm productivity. 
In this Public Paper, the author presents the latest academic 
insights into the recent development in economic science on the 
subject of leadership. What are the challenges that researchers 
face when studying leadership? Why are words so important 
and why can a leader – in some cases – be more effective by 
restricting how much information he or she shares with follow-
ers? You will receive the answers to these and related questions 
from Prof. Roberto Weber, a leading specialist in behavioral 
and experimental economics. 
As in the other papers of this series, the author of this Public 
Paper is an international top specialist in his field, and the  
Public Paper is written in a clear, compact, and highly readable 
format, free of academic jargon and understandable without 
prior knowledge about the subject. It therefore meets the UBS 
Center’s aspiration to provide new relevant research findings 
on key economic topics of our time to a broad audience. 
All that remains is for me to wish you much enjoyment while 
reading it!
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areas of behavioral and experimental eco-
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Professor Weber is a CESifo Research Net-
work Fellow and an Associate Editor at  
Management Science and the Journal of the 
European Economic Association. He is also 
on the Editorial Boards of Experimental  
Economics, The Leadership Quarterly, and 
Organization Science. 
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Economists have typically assumed that the 
only way for leaders to get people to do 
things is to use carrots (e.g., pay raises) or 
sticks (e.g., threats of firing) to incentivize a 
desired behavior. One of the important  
contributions of recent research on leader-
ship is to test the extent to which this really 
is true. Can leaders also motivate and inspire 
workers by their statements and speeches? 
Or, is the best way to get followers to do 
something by creating hard incentives for 
them? 
A rapidly growing set of economic studies 
view leadership as a fundamental issue in 
understanding firms and government. In this 
Public Paper, the author reviews recent devel-
opments in economic science on this subject. 
While many research findings confirm some 
commonly held beliefs about leadership, 
other findings turn many of them upside 
down. For example, one striking set of find-
ings is the extent to which mere words have 
a similar – or, sometimes even stronger – 
effect than financial incentives. 
Moreover, research shows that a leader’s  
success or failure is often a haphazard pro-
cess – full of biases and luck – and frequently 
detached from the noble traits we assume to 
be characteristic of good leadership. An 
effective leader will take this into account, 
recognizing that there are many strategies 
that make leaders successful or unsuccessful, 
but that he or she often has little control over 
many other important factors. This new  
evidence will greatly affect the insights econ-
omists can disperse to practitioners about 
how to lead organizations and societies more 
effectively.  
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There is a widespread conventional wis-
dom that leadership is important for the 
functioning of firms and societies. The 
actions and words of political leaders 
command great attention, as with the 
annual “State of the Union” speech deliv-
ered by United States’ presidents and 
other similar addresses by national lead-
ers. The business press and shareholders 
emphasize the importance of CEO turn-
over and the valuable role of a strong 
leader − such as Walt Disney, Jack Welch, 
or Steve Jobs − for defining corporate 
culture, establishing vision and priorities, 
and influencing a firm’s profitability. 
Financial markets closely attend to and 
scrutinize the credibility of central bank-
ers’ public statements about economic 
conditions and future policy directions. 
Even local school boards and amateur 
sports teams concern themselves greatly 
with who is leading them and with what 
these people say and do. Moreover, his-
tory and the arts are full of prominent 
examples of influential leaders inspiring 
bold action merely by their statements to 
followers − from Mark Anthony’s, 
“Friends, Romans, countrymen …” 
speech in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, to 
Winston Churchill’s famous radio 
address to Great Britain (“we shall fight 
on the beaches … we shall never surren-
der”) at the onset of World War II. We all 
agree, it seems, that leaders matter.
However, one group of people for whom 
leadership seems to matter little is econo-
mists. If you took economics courses 
while studying at university, think back 
to them. You almost certainly learned 
about firms, perhaps something about 
how they operate and what makes them 
profitable. But it is also very likely that 
there was virtually no role for leadership 
in these firms. In discussions of govern-
ments and policy, there was also very 
likely little discussion of leadership as an 
important factor. To the extent that there 
was something like leadership in these 
courses, it was probably exclusively 
focused on a “leader” as someone in a 
firm who sets pay contracts in order to 
motivate workers to exert effort. To date, 
the study of “leadership” in economics 
still focuses primarily on corporate lead-
ers as managers who obtain worker 
effort and influence profitability mainly 
by structuring contracts and incentives in 
conjunction with performance monitor-
ing.1 Similarly, in the case of political 
leaders − even though economists have 
cleverly shown that such leaders matter 
− the economic perspective focuses pri-
marily on political leaders’ ability to 
impact outcomes through their influence 
on economic policies (see box “Do lead-
ers matter for economic growth?” and 
figure 1 on page 5 and 6).
But, is this really all that leaders do? I 
suspect most of us would disagree. In the 
typical person’s view of the role of a 
CEO, there is more to this professional 
function than making strategic decisions 
and establishing compensation policies. 
As John Kotter noted in an influential 
1990 Harvard Business Review article,2 
effective corporate leaders create a vision 
for the future of a company and inspire 
and motivate employees to pursue this 
vision, often voluntarily. Similarly, strong 
political leaders do more than manipulate 
policy levers, they also reassure citizens 
and markets in times of crisis, and con-
vince them of an obligation to prioritize 
the common good over their narrow self-
interest. Think of John F. Kennedy’s dec-
laration, “My fellow Americans, ask not 
what your country can do for you, ask 
what you can do for your country,” 
Introduction
5which had no immediate impact on pol-
icy, but is the type of bold and influential 
statement we associate with strong and 
effective leadership.
But, this notion of leadership − even 
though widely recognized by most people 
as important for understanding what 
Do leaders matter for economic growth?
An important question for economists is whether national leaders 
affect economic growth. People certainly believe that there are 
good and bad national leaders, and that the good ones produce 
greater prosperity for their countries. But, showing this is difficult. 
It may be, for example, that US presidents who preside over periods 
of economic growth − say, Barack Obama or Ronald Reagan − 
actually played critical roles in producing that growth. Or, perhaps 
other factors present at the time of their elections, or even factors 
that produced their elections, led to subsequent growth. Similarly, 
while it is natural to interpret the contraction of Zimbabwe’s 
economy over more than a decade in the early 2000s as resulting 
from Robert Mugabe’s presidency, it may be the case that other 
conditions, such as poor institutions, led to both the economic 
contraction and the persistence of Mugabe in power.
To be able to provide a conclusive answer to the question of whether 
national leaders affect economic growth, one needs variation in 
leadership that is unlikely to be affected by conditions present in 
a particular country. That is, one needs leaders to come and go 
randomly, and then use this random variation to identify whether 
they have an effect on outcomes. One clever approach, used by 
Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken,3 looks at cases in which  
there was a change in national leadership due to death by natural 
causes or an accident − that is, changes in leadership that are 
unlikely to have been caused by economic conditions, policies put 
in place because of those conditions, or expectations of future 
conditions. 
The study finds that, in fact, changes in leadership do affect eco-
nomic growth trajectories. This is illustrated in figure 1 (on the next 
page), which demonstrates some clear changes in the trajectory 
of per capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity, across 
time following the death of a national leader (indicated by the solid 
vertical lines). Importantly, this relationship is stronger in countries 
where leaders possess greater autocratic power, which is where 
one would expect national leaders to have stronger effects.
makes some firms successful and others 
fail − is largely absent from economic 
theories and research. Part of this is the 
result of skepticism among many econo-
mists that such leadership really matters. 
After all, in a science rooted in the power 
of “hard” incentives, what room is there 
for the “softer” forms of inspiration and 
persuasion exerted by corporate and 
political leaders? 
Fortunately, this is changing, as more 
economic research directly studies the 
inspirational and motivational functions 
of leadership, and how these aspects of 
leaders can influence firm productivity. 
This is fortunate on two fronts. First,  
it fills an important hole in economic 
research − the study of how leaders shape 
the behavior of followers. Second, it 
brings the rigorous methods of economic 
research to the study of leadership. This 
is important, as economists are often very 
careful and critical in establishing 
whether a specific factor − such as a  
particular type of leader − really causes 
particular outcomes. In the case of leader-
ship, where there is a great deal of  
conventional wisdom about the powerful 
effects of leaders, this rigorous scrutiny  
is valuable for identifying what exactly 
leaders do and do not do. That is, econo-
mists contribute to our understanding  
of leadership both by asking how much 
of what leaders do can really be shown to 
matter? And, relatedly, where do leaders 
matter less than people think?
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Note: Figure shows the logarithm of purchasing-power-parity adjusted GDP per capita in different countries that experienced a 
“random” leadership change. The tenures of the relevant leaders are indicated by the vertical lines.
Source: Jones and Olken (2005)
Fig. 1  Growth and leader deaths
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7Before proceeding to the research, it is 
worth stressing at least two reasons why 
economists have understudied leadership. 
This will provide insights into the chal-
lenges of studying leadership, and into 
the approaches economists have recently 
employed in how they approach the 
study of leadership.
First, if leaders’ influence is often through 
words that motivate and inspire, how  
can this be reconciled with economic  
theory, which is traditionally dependent 
on models of the effects of “hard” incen-
tives, such as pay contracts? The notion 
that words − even powerful words like, 
“My fellow Americans, ask not what 
your country can do for you, ask what 
you can do for your country” − can lead  
people to act differently are difficult to 
incorporate into economic models. But, 
as the research below shows, this kind of 
leadership has an effect on behavior. 
Hence, this reflects more of a problem 
with textbook economics than with  
leadership as topic worthy of economists’ 
attention.
The second challenge is more serious. 
People will frequently claim that a leader 
is effective because he or she produced 
good outcomes. But, showing that the 
leader actually produced the outcomes − 
as opposed to some other factor that 
exerted significant influence over out-
comes − is often impossible. For example, 
Nelson Mandela is credited with facili-
tating the end of apartheid and the peace-
ful transition to a society with equal 
rights in South Africa, and very likely 
played a critical role in this process. But, 
can we know what would have happened 
without him? Perhaps the same outcomes 
would have resulted without him. (As 
we’ll see in the next section, a “good 
leader” might simply be someone who 
stumbles into the right situation.)  
Without the ability to study a world with 
a particular leader’s influence and one 
without that leader, it is impossible to 
know with certainty whether the leader 
had an effect. Therefore, much of the 
economic research on leadership has  
benefited from experiments, where 
almost identical situations − that differ 
only in the presence or absence of a 
leader, or in the type of leader present − 
are studied. This simple method, which 
often takes place in abstract laboratory 
environments, has provided some of the 
most important insights and tests in  
economics for better understanding the 
factors that influence human behavior 
(see box “Experiments in Economics” on 
page 8).
The difficulty of studying  
leadership
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Experiments in economics − A valuable 
research tool
Most areas of science rely on controlled experimentation. This 
is often the only way to truly establish, for instance, that some 
factor, X, causes some phenomenon, Y. By experimentally varying 
whether or not X is present, and holding everything else constant, 
researchers are able to cleanly determine whether X actually 
causes Y. So, for example, to test whether a particular gene causes 
a disease, the most compelling evidence arises when scientists 
can manipulate the presence or absence of the gene, perhaps in 
animals, and then observe whether or not the disease occurs. 
Economics as a research discipline has historically not relied on 
experimental methods. However, this began to change with 
pioneering work by Vernon Smith and others, in the 1960s, who 
developed methods for conducting carefully controlled laboratory 
experiments in economics. In such experiments, complex real-
world contexts like markets and firms are simplified into a simple 
set of interactions between laboratory subjects, usually students, 
who make decisions (e.g., buying, selling, choosing a hypothetical 
level of effort) that are rewarded financially in a manner that  
corresponds to how such actions are rewarded in the real world.  
In 2002, Smith received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic  
Sciences, precisely for his path breaking work in introducing this 
type of experimental research to economics.
In the last several decades, the use of laboratory experiments  
has expanded and become part of the toolkit employed by econo-
mists to study how different factors affect economic behavior and 
outcomes. For example, Elinor Ostrom (2009 Nobel Laureate) used 
experiments in her research on how alternative institutions facili- 
tate societies’ management of common resources. Alvin Roth 
(2012 Nobel Laureate) has used experiments extensively in his 
research designing and testing the effectiveness of market mecha-
nisms for producing efficient outcomes in important policy areas, 
such as matching kidney donors to recipients.
As we will see, controlled experiments are especially important  
in the study of leadership, since they often present the only way to 
determine whether some characteristic of leaders is responsible 
for the behavior of followers or organizational outcomes. In such 
experiments, a group of “workers” often makes hypothetical effort 
choices, and are paid for some combination of their efforts. To 
understand the effects of leadership, the researcher varies whether 
and how a leader can exert influence over the group.
Elinor Ostrom by © Holger Motzkau 
Alvin Roth by © Bengt Nyman
Vernon Smith © Cato Institute
9Being a “good” leader may have 
nothing to do with leadership
Before discussing several instances that 
demonstrate how leaders are effective  
in influencing the behaviors of followers, 
we start with some striking examples  
of where our conventional wisdoms 
about the importance of leaders − and 
the characteristics that make them  
effective − seem to be unwarranted.
To do this, we’ll first introduce a situa-
tion − based on simple game theory − 
that is particularly powerful for studying 
the effectiveness of leadership. Suppose 
that a firm has several workers, who can 
commit some level of effort to a collec-
tive endeavor. This could be working 
more hours, working faster, keeping  
company secrets, or maintaining a high 
level of service when interacting with  
customers. The particular situation we’re 
interested in is one in which the lowest 
level of effort expended by any worker 
determines how productive the firm is as 
a whole. This is a kind of production 
often referred to as “weak-link” produc-
tion, because the weakest link determines 
the overall strength of the chain. For 
example, consider a luxury hotel brand, 
where any instance of poor service can  
be disastrous for the firm’s reputation, or 
a highly regulated industry where any  
compliance violation can be very costly 
and endanger the firm’s survival. 
A simple game from game theory can 
provide us with an example of weak-link 
production, as shown in figure 2. Specifi-
cally, suppose that you are an employee 
of a firm who must choose some amount 
of effort to contribute toward a common 
goal. Working as hard as possible toward 
this goal represents giving 100% effort, 
while not working at all toward this goal 
and doing something else instead repre-
sents 0% effort. What you care about is 
how much effort you exert, and the low-
est level of effort provided by anyone in 
the firm. These combinations yield differ-
ent levels of benefit for you, net of any 
effort you put in. This level of benefit 
could represent, for example, how happy 
you are with that outcome, after taking 
into account all the work you put into  
it and how much of a final bonus you get 
for that outcome. So, for example, the 
greatest benefit for you (200) is when 
everyone, including you, exerts 100% 
effort. This is when the firm is most  
profitable and you are well compensated 
for the effort that you put in. But, the 
worst outcome for you is when you exert 
100% effort and someone in the firm 
exerts no effort, which gives you a bene-
fit level of zero. In this case, you would 
rather have also exerted 0% effort, end-
ing up with a net benefit of 100, which  
is worse than 200 but better than 0.
Note that, in this kind of weak-link pro-
duction setting, if someone else in the 
organization only exerts 50% of the total 
possible effort, then you do not benefit 
by exerting more than 50%. You get 150 
by also exerting 50% effort, and do 
worse by exerting more effort − for 
example, you only get 125 if you exert 
75% effort. Similarly, you do worse by 
exerting less effort than 50%, since in 
that case you lower the minimum effort 
in the organization; for example, if you 
exert 25% effort, then the new minimum 
in the organization is 25% and your  
benefit is 125. If even one person in the 
organization is shirking entirely − by 
exerting 0% effort − then no one benefits 
from exerting any effort at all. However, 
if everyone exerts 100% of the possible 
effort, indicated by the green outcome at 
the top-left of the table, then the firm is 
highly productive and everyone is as well 
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off as possible. Nobody wants to exert 
less than 100% effort in this case, since 
200 is the greatest possible benefit in  
the table.
Hence, this situation requires mutual 
confidence among workers − they need  
to recognize the benefits of exerting high 
effort and they need to have confidence 
that all other team members will do so. 
In this sense, the game nicely mirrors 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s warning about 
the Great Depression as a situation in 
which, “the only thing we have to fear is 
fear itself” − if everyone is confident that 
everyone else will exert 100% effort, 
then there is no reason for anyone not  
to exert 100% of the possible effort.  
But, doubt − or fear about what others 
will do − can be disastrous. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, maintaining 
high effort in this kind of setting becomes 
more challenging if there are more work-
ers involved. When there are only two 
people, they only need to worry about 
one another exerting high effort. When 
there are many more people involved,  
it becomes harder to maintain the high  
levels of mutual confidence necessary to 
keep everyone choosing 100% effort − 
there are simply more people to worry 
about. Hence, as a leader trying to get 
people to exert high effort, it is much 
easier to do this when the group of work-
ers is small than when it is large. 
One study by experimental economists 
exploited this difference in easy- vs. hard-
to-lead situations, to see if leaders are 
credited or blamed for things over which 
they have no control.4 In a laboratory 
experiment, subjects in the role of  
“leaders” were randomly assigned to try 
to get either easy-to-lead groups (with 
few members) or hard-to-lead groups 
(with many more members) to exert high 
effort. The weak-link production situa-
tion was repeated eight times, and after 
the second repetition, leaders stood at  
the front of the room, and gave short 
speeches after receiving suggestions on 
Note: This table describes a “weak-link” production setting, where the 
benefit to you (a worker) of exerting effort depends on the lowest effort 
expended by anyone in the firm. The top-left outcome (shaded in green) is 
the best possible outcome. The bottom-right outcome (shaded in purple) 
is what will happen if people think someone else will exert zero effort. 
Since it is impossible for your effort to be lower than the lowest by anyone 
in the firm, some cells are empty.
Fig. 2 Your benefits from different combinations of own and others’ 
 effort levels in a weak-link setting
 100 %
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 25 %
 0 %
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Note: The figure shows the average effort exerted in groups that are easy to 
lead and hard to lead. In the experiment, groups performed the effort task 
for two time periods. Then a randomly selected leader spoke to the group, 
before the third trial. At this point, participants in the experiment rated the 
quality of the leader. After six additional periods, during which the situation 
determined which groups succeeded or failed, participants again evaluated 
the quality of the leader.
Source: Weber et al. (2001)
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the content of the speeches. The main 
interest in the study was in the extent to 
which leaders were perceived to be good 
or bad leaders, and whether they were 
rewarded or blamed for outcomes over 
which they had no control.
Figure 3 shows the degree of effort 
expended across time in the study. In the 
first period, there is very little difference 
in effort expended in small and large 
groups. However, in the second period, 
one can already see the differences in 
how easy and hard to lead the two situa-
tions are. After leaders spoke, between 
periods 2 and 3, there was an increase in 
effort in both settings − thus, the state-
ments by leaders appear to have had an 
effect in getting people to exert more 
effort. But, in the longer term, the degree 
to which the two situations are easy or 
hard to lead has a stronger effect on out-
comes. Groups either succeed or fail 
based on how large the groups are, with 
little effect of leaders.
The key measure in the study was people’s 
perceptions of how good the leaders are. 
Participants in the experiment were there-
fore asked to evaluate the leader’s “over-
all leadership ability,” both immediately 
after the leader spoke (after period 2) and 
at the end of the study (after period 8), 
after the leaders had succeeded or failed 
based on the situation in which they were 
placed.
Figure 4 on the right provides the ratings 
of how good people perceive the leaders 
to be. As the left part of the graph indi-
cates, leaders were evaluated as equally 
good based on what they actually did as 
leaders − that is, immediately after they 
addressed their groups. This is what  
we would expect, since the leaders did 
not differ systematically in their ability.  
But, at the end of the experiment, when 
leaders in easy-to-lead situations had 
“succeeded” in getting high effort from 
groups and leaders in hard-to-lead situa-
tions had failed, we see a large difference 
in how leaders are evaluated − an almost 
Note: The left part of the graph shows the average rating of leaders’ ability 
immediately after they spoke. The right part shows responses to the same 
question at the end of the experiment.  Ratings are from 1 (extremely poor) 
to 9 (extremely good).
Source: Weber et al. (2001)
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Fig. 4 Ratings of leadership quality are determined by the situation
 Immediately after speech Final evaluation
Ratings are from 1 (extremely poor) to 9 (extremely good)
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Key implication #1: Our evaluations of leaders are  
often biased by factors over which the leaders have  
no control.
sation of CEOs in the oil industry varies 
significantly with variations in the price 
of oil − again, a factor that is largely 
beyond the leader’s control.6 
So, while what is perhaps the cleanest 
evidence of this phenomenon arises in an 
abstract laboratory experiment, we see 
similar evidence from important economic 
and political contexts (another particu-
larly striking example is depicted in the 
box “Leadership – More than face value?” 
on page 13).
1.5-point difference on a 9-point scale. 
Moreover, the experiment also showed 
that members of groups with leaders in 
hard-to-lead situations were more willing 
to pay to replace the current leader, even 
though the leaders’ actual ability had 
nothing to do with whether the group 
succeeded or failed.
A natural question is always whether a 
result like this is something that only 
occurs in a laboratory experiment, with 
people who are not experienced leaders 
and with evaluations by students incen-
tivized by relatively small amounts of 
money. Laboratory experiments like 
these naturally sacrifice realism in order 
to make a point cleanly and to rule out 
other interpretations. But, the question  
of whether something that happens in a 
laboratory setting also happens in the 
“real world” is an important one. There-
fore, it is valuable that data from impor-
tant real-world settings supports the 
findings from this study. For instance, a 
research study by Justin Wolfers uses 
state level gubernatorial elections from 
the United States to study whether in-
cumbent governors are credited or blamed 
for economic conditions that are beyond 
their control − for example, for variation 
in the price of oil, which affects state-
level economic growth but is determined 
in international markets over which state- 
level policies exert very little influence.5 
Consistent with the above laboratory 
experiment, incumbent state governors 
are rewarded and punished at the ballot 
box for factors that they do not control. 
Another study shows that the compen-
13
Leadership – More than face value?
We like to think that successful leaders are those who possess 
great intellect, vision and communication abilities, and who obtain 
results through the effects of their words and actions on followers. 
As I note in this section, successful leaders may often be those 
who simply happen to find themselves in the right − i.e., easy-to-
lead − situations.
There is also other striking evidence that what makes one leader 
more successful than another may depend on seemingly irrelevant 
factors. A clever study by Princeton researchers showed people 
pictures of unfamiliar candidates for political office − in elections 
for the US Senate and House of Representatives − and asked these 
people to rate how competent the person appeared, based solely 
on what they could infer from the picture.7 Strikingly, these very 
superficial ratings of competence predicted the actual election 
outcomes far better than chance − the candidate whose appearance 
was perceived as more competent won the election roughly 70% 
of the time. As the graph on the right shows, the differences in 
competence ratings provided by people who knew nothing about 
the candidates even predicted the differences in actual vote shares 
between the two candidates.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, in a subsequent study researchers 
asked Swiss children, aged 5 to 13, to view faces of pairs of can-
didates from French parliamentary elections and select one to be 
“the captain of your boat” on a hypothetical adventure.8 Again, the 
children’s ratings accurately predicted which candidate obtained 
more votes in the actual election much better than chance − in this 
case, 71% of the time. 
What these results show is that who is perceived to be an effective 
leader − in fact, who gets elected to very powerful leadership posi-
tions in government − is strongly influenced by seemingly irrelevant 
aspects of physical appearance that have little to do with what we 
would think of as leadership.
Note: Researchers asked people to rate the general 
competence of two unfamiliar people. The faces  
corresponded to candidates in US Congressional and 
Senate elections. For instance, some people saw 
pictures of the two candidates above, Russ Feingold 
(left) and Tim Michels (right), who contested the 
2004 election for a Senate seat from Wisconsin. As 
the bottom graph shows, there was a strong positive 
relationship between the percentage of people view-
ing one candidate as more competent (even though 
these people knew nothing about the two candi-
dates) and the candidate’s vote share in the actual 
election contested between the two candidates.
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Source: Todorov et al. (2005)
Which person is the more competent?
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The power of leading by example 
(and keeping followers partly in 
the dark)
One of the most important economic 
insights into how leaders can influence 
followers comes from the work of Benja-
min Hermalin. He notes that leaders often 
convey the importance and value of an 
activity by the example they set for those 
they lead − for example, a boss working 
long hours to convey the importance of  
a project or Joseph Stalin remaining in 
Moscow to encourage resistance by others 
during the battle for the city in World 
War II. Hermalin’s work produced math-
ematical models of why this kind of leader-
ship might be effective, and why it often 
crucially depends on followers not having 
as much information as the leader.9
While the models are too complicated to 
describe in detail here, the key insight can 
be understood through a simple example 
that uses a bit of game theory. Suppose a 
boss can either “relax” − go skiing over 
the weekend with friends and family − or 
“work” − come in and spend an other-
wise nice weekend at the office. A worker 
also faces these same two choices, and is 
free to voluntarily decide whether to 
spend the weekend working. Weekends 
vary in terms of the impact that working 
has on the firm’s success or profitability, 
from which both the boss and worker 
potentially benefit. Specifically, there is 
either a “great,” “moderate,” or “low” 
productivity from spending Sunday 
working, and each type of weekend is 
equally likely. The three tables on the 
right describe the overall benefits, to the 
boss and to the worker, from spending 
the weekend either relaxing or working.
The numbers in each cell of the tables 
represent how desirable the worker and 
Fig. 5 Simple game-theoretic example of boss’s and worker’s 
 benefits from working over the weekend
Work
Relax
Relax
Worker: 150,
Boss: 250
Worker: 100,
Boss: 100
Boss’s decision
Work
Worker: 300,
Boss: 300
Worker: 250,
Boss: 150
Benefit from spending the weekend working when the productivity is high:
Worker’s 
decision
Work
Relax
Relax
Worker: 75,
Boss: 175
Worker: 100,
Boss: 100
Boss’s decision
Work
Worker: 150,
Boss: 150
Worker: 175,
Boss: 75
Benefit from spending the weekend working when the productivity is moderate:
Worker’s 
decision
Note: These tables describe the value to a boss and worker from different combi-
nations of their decisions to spend the weekend relaxing or working. In each 
cell, the first number describes the value to the worker of that outcome and the 
second number describes the value to the boss. The values can be interpreted 
relative to a baseline of 100 units of satisfaction from spending the weekend 
relaxing (i.e., the Relax-Relax outcome always yields a benefit of 100 for both the 
boss and worker).
Source: Tables adapted from Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2007)
Work
Relax
Relax
Worker: 0,
Boss: 100
Worker: 100,
Boss: 100
Boss’s decision
Work
Worker: 0,
Boss: 0
Worker: 100,
Boss: 0
Benefit from spending the weekend working when the productivity is low:
Worker’s 
decision
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boss find the resulting outcomes. The 
first number shows the value of that out-
come for the worker and the second 
number for the boss. So, for example, in 
every table, the bottom-right cell shows 
that if both boss and worker spend the 
weekend relaxing, they always get a base-
line satisfaction of 100, regardless of how 
productive it would have been to spend 
the weekend at the office. 
In the table, the rows and columns high-
lighted in blue indicate the preferred 
choice for the boss and worker, if they 
know the actual benefit from working 
that weekend. Thus, when there is low 
productivity from working, as in the bot-
tom table, neither has any reason to 
work. When there is moderate benefit, 
they both are better off if they both 
spend the weekend working (Worker: 
150, Boss: 150) than if they both do not 
(Worker: 100, Boss: 100). But, each pre-
fers to spend the weekend relaxing, and 
getting a benefit of 175, while the other 
works and gets a benefit of only 75. So, 
when both of them know there is only 
moderate productivity from working, no 
one will work − but each will hope that 
the other one does so.
In weekends with high productivity from 
working, things are different. Both boss 
and worker prefer to spend the weekend 
working, even if the other does not do so 
− the returns from working are simply 
higher, regardless of what the other does.
So, economic theory gives us a simple 
prediction when both boss and worker 
know what type of weekend it is: both 
will work when there is high productivity 
from doing so, but neither will work 
when the productivity is low or moder-
ate. This is true even though they would 
both benefit if they both chose to work 
when productivity is moderate, each 
receiving 150, rather than both relaxing 
and receiving 100.
Now, consider what happens if only the 
boss knows what type of weekend it is − 
whether there is high, moderate or low 
productivity from working. And, suppose 
that the boss can tell the worker, on Fri-
day, “I’m going to spend the weekend at 
the office.” That is, the boss can set an 
example by committing to work over the 
upcoming weekend. It turns out that, in 
this situation, game theory tells us that 
the boss will choose to work both when 
the productivity from working is high 
and when it is moderate, and the worker 
will always work when the boss chooses 
to do so. 
A key part of this prediction is not only 
that the worker observes that the boss 
works on the weekend, but also that the 
worker does not know the actual produc-
tivity of working on the weekend. For 
example, if the worker knew that the 
actual productivity was moderate, then 
seeing the boss working would not lead 
the worker to voluntarily work that 
weekend − the worker would still prefer 
to relax and receive 175 than work and 
receive 150. (Of course, we are assuming 
that the boss can’t simply make the 
worker come to work over the weekend, 
which is true in some real-world employ-
ment relationships but certainly not in 
others; but, these are precisely the kinds 
of situations where a leader’s ability to 
motivate followers is critical.)
But, if the worker does not know the 
actual productivity, then seeing the boss 
coming to work over the weekend leaves 
the worker believing that the actual pro-
ductivity must be either high or moderate 
− the boss would never work if it were a 
low-productivity weekend. In this case, 
the worker knows that working will yield 
him an outcome of either 300 or 150, and 
each is equally likely. So, in expectation, 
the worker receives 225 (½ × 300 + ½ × 
150) from working. On the other hand, 
relaxing will yield the worker an outcome 
of either 250 or 175, where again each is 
equally likely, meaning that the expected 
benefit from not working is 212.5 (½ × 
250 + ½ × 175). Since 225 is more than 
212.5, the worker will come into work 
when he sees the boss doing so.
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Therefore, a critical element of this theo-
retical prediction is not just that the 
worker sees the boss working, but that 
the worker is “in the dark” about the 
actual productivity from working that 
weekend. The fact that the worker 
doesn’t really know the actual productiv-
ity of the weekend is what motivates him 
to work when it is moderate − he doesn’t 
want to miss out on the benefits of work-
ing on a high-productivity weekend.  
So, to be effective, a boss needs not only 
to lead by example (by working on week-
ends when the productivity from doing 
so is either high or moderate), but the 
boss must also keep workers uninformed 
about the true value of working that 
weekend; otherwise, they will never work 
when the actual productivity is moderate. 
Note also that the worker does not mind 
this lack of information. The worker 
ends up doing better when both end up 
working over the weekend (150) than 
when they both do not (100).
Of course, this is a theoretical prediction. 
Does it actually work as predicted? A 
clever study by Jan Potters, Martin Sefton, 
and Lise Vesterlund tested this prediction. 
They recreated the above situation in a 
laboratory experiment, where human 
subjects made choices through computer 
terminals and received real money that 
corresponded to the outcomes in the 
tables above. A key element of the experi-
ment was that in some cases workers 
knew the actual benefits from working, 
while in others they did not. This lets us 
see whether it is actually important for 
workers to be in the dark in order to 
follow the leader’s example.
This is evident in figure 6, which shows 
the frequency with which workers chose 
to work, after observing the boss choos-
ing to work. When the workers knew  
the actual productivity, they worked only 
one-third of the time that they saw the 
boss working. But, when workers did not 
know the true productivity, they worked 
81% of the time that they saw the boss 
working, confirming the key prediction 
Workers know
actual productivity 
Workers “in the dark” 
about productivity
100
80
60
40
20
0
In %
Fig. 6  Leading by example can be more effective when workers have
 less information
Source: Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2007)
Note: The graph shows the percentage of the time that a worker will choose 
to work, after observing the boss working, and based on whether the worker 
knows the actual productivity of working (“high,” “moderate” or “low”) or 
does not know the productivity. 
“Low” “Moderate” “High”
100
80
60
40
20
0
In %
Fig. 7  Frequency of workers’ working based on productivity and 
 knowledge about productivity – Setting in which leaders can
 lead by example
Source: Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2007)
Note: The graph above shows the frequency with which workers’ work, 
based on the productivity of working (“low,” “moderate,” or “high”) and 
whether the workers know the actual productivity or are unaware of it. 
Productivity from working
  Workers know actual productivity     
  Workers “in the dark” about productivity
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of the theory. So, consistent with game 
theory, the leaders are more effective 
when workers are in the dark about the 
actual productivity of working.
Does this actually lead to workers work-
ing more when the productivity of the 
weekend is moderate? Figure 7 shows 
what happened. Consistent with the  
theory, when workers know the actual 
productivity, they work very little when 
the productivity is either low or moderate 
− these are the cases in which the worker 
is better off not working, though the 
worker would prefer the outcome in 
which both the boss and worker work 
when productivity is moderate to the  
outcome in which neither works. Also 
consistent with the theory, workers 
almost always work when the productiv-
ity is high and they know this.
When the workers are in the dark − and 
do not know the actual productivity, they 
also work very little when productivity is 
low and work a lot when productivity is 
high. But, now, they also work a lot more 
(64% of the time) when productivity is 
moderate. This is because they are  
following leaders who work both when 
productivity is high and when it is mod-
erate as the theory predicts. Note that this 
makes everyone better off, as both bosses 
and workers benefit from both of them 
Key implication #2: Leading by example is more effec-
tive when leaders have better information than their  
followers. In some cases, a leader can be more effective 
by restricting how much information he or she shares 
with followers, and letting the leader’s actions do the 
talking.
working, rather than relaxing, when the 
productivity is moderate.
18
UBS Center Public Paper The Economics of Leadership
As I noted earlier, economists have typi-
cally assumed that the only way, as a 
leader, to get people to do things is to use 
carrots (e.g., pay raises) or sticks (e.g., 
threats of firing) to incentivize the behav-
ior. One of the important contributions 
of recent research on leadership in eco-
nomics is to test the extent to which this 
is really true. Can leaders also “moti-
vate” and “inspire” workers by their 
statements and speeches? Or is the only 
way to get followers to do something to 
create hard incentives for them to do it?
Several studies use the weak-link environ-
ment that we described earlier to investi-
gate the power of words as a motiva-
tional instrument of leaders. As we al-
ready saw, leaders speaking to groups  
in this type of situation can produce 
increases in effort − though, in that case, 
the situations were either so easy or diffi-
cult to lead that, in the end, the leaders 
made little difference. But, more recent 
studies investigate how the effect of lead-
ers speaking to groups compares to the 
effects of simply paying people to exert 
more effort. 
The most direct comparison is from a 
study described in figure 8.10 In this 
study, subjects in a laboratory experi-
ment again performed the weak-link task 
for several periods, in this case 18. The 
situation was constructed, by modifying 
the benefits from different outcomes, to 
be initially challenging − so that groups 
almost always failed in the first 6 periods. 
Then, the study introduced two possible 
mechanisms for improving effort. 
In some cases, the groups were paid more 
for exerting higher effort − imagine  
adding higher numbers to the outcomes 
in the upper left of the table that we saw 
before (see figure 2 on page 10). As the 
red line in the figure on the next page 
shows, paying people more for higher 
effort was effective. Not surprisingly, 
people contributed more effort when they 
had more to gain from doing so. Effort 
increased immediately to about 60%. 
But, this increased effort, while per-
sistent, declined over time to settle  
at around 20% of the possible effort. 
So, paying people more leads them to 
exert more effort, but the effects are 
limited in this case.
In another intervention, represented by 
the green line in the graph, the groups 
were not paid any more than they had 
been earlier, but one person was ran-
domly selected to act as a “leader” and 
make statements to the group before each 
of the remaining 12 trials. These state-
ments typically urged followers to exert 
higher effort and pointed to the mutual 
benefits that could be obtained by every-
one working harder. These statements 
gave the workers no additional informa-
tion − in this case, the leader did not have 
access to any information that the work-
ers did not have. However, as the figure 
shows, these statements have a much 
stronger effect on the effort provided 
than simply paying more. Average effort 
jumps to about 70% as soon as a leader 
is able to address the groups. More 
importantly, the effect of having a leader 
continues to be large throughout the 
remaining periods, yielding effort consis-
tently above 50%.
While “leaders” in the above experiment 
are simply participants in a laboratory 
experiment − mainly university students 
− another study shows that the effects 
can be even larger when one turns to 
experienced leaders.11 This study uses a 
Words matter
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sample of Executive MBA program par-
ticipants, with at least five years of expe-
rience in supervisory roles and average 
annual earnings over $120,000. The key 
difference between these experienced 
managers and students is that the manag-
ers are more likely to use good communi-
cation strategies − good managers in this 
study, and other related ones, avoid  
making vague long-term recommenda-
tions for higher effort and instead make 
specific requests for a concrete level of 
effort, which may not be the highest one, 
and highlight the mutual benefit to all 
workers of jointly reaching this effort  
target. That is, statements like, “OK, let’s 
try all moving to 50% effort − give it a 
shot; if we all do it at this moment, we 
will improve our earnings from 100 to 
150,” tend to be the most effective. Ex-
ecutive MBAs tended to be more likely to 
use effective messages of this kind and 
were, therefore, more effective as leaders.
The power of words versus incentives  
is also evident in a recent field experiment 
conducted in a collaboration between 
researchers at the University of Zurich, 
the University of Lausanne, and the  
University of Birmingham.12 This study 
set out to test whether real workers in a 
natural setting, who are unaware that 
they are participating in an experiment, 
can be influenced to exert more effort 
merely by the words and rhetorical tech-
niques employed in communication from 
a leader. The study involved a fundraising 
campaign for a children’s hospital in the 
UK. As part of the campaign, workers 
were hired through a temporary employ-
ment agency to prepare envelopes to be 
distributed to potential donors. The key 
In % Average effort exerted by workers
Fig. 8 Average effort in response to incentive- and leadership-based interventions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Trial period
 Intervention: Leadership (words)        Intervention: More pay       No change
Source: Data from Brandts, Cooper and Weber (2014)
Note: Graph shows average effort by workers in a weak-link setting, where the first stage (periods 1–6) was designed to induce fail-
ure and the second stage (7–18) tested the effectiveness of higher pay and statements from leaders for producing a “turnaround.”
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measure in the study was how many 
envelopes workers completed during the 
period in which they were supposed to  
be working. 
To study the power of words and charis-
ma, in comparison with incentives, the 
study employed three different variations. 
In one, the Baseline, workers received a 
motivational speech from a leader that 
contained a lot of information about the 
purpose of the fundraising campaign and 
the good it would do. In a second ver-
sion, workers received a speech that was 
identical in substance, but utilized a 
greater number of charismatic leadership 
techniques in communication − including 
metaphors, similes and analogies, con-
trasts, rhetorical questions, the setting of 
high goals, and more animated voice  
and gestures (see box “More than words”  
on page 22). In both cases, a professional 
actor hired by the research team deliv-
ered the speeches. Finally, in a third  
version of the experiment, the actor 
delivered a speech with the same moder-
ate level of charisma as in the Baseline, 
but workers were paid considerably more 
for completing envelopes.
Hence, the study tests the effectiveness, 
relative to the Baseline, of either paying 
workers more or using more charismatic 
communication as means for a leader to 
motivate more effort from followers. 
This is the first study to compare these 
two tools available to leaders in an 
experiment using real workers.
The results of the study are provided in 
the graphs on the right. In the Baseline, 
workers completed, on average 230.9 let-
ters. Not surprisingly, when they were 
paid more, workers completed more let-
ters − the average increased to 277.7. 
However, by instead providing workers 
with a more carefully constructed and 
delivered speech, the increase in their 
effort was almost identical to that under 
the much higher pay. In this case, they 
completed 271.2 envelopes, a 17.4% 
increase over the Baseline. Thus, this 
Baseline High IncentivesHigh Charisma
Speech from Leader
+20.2 %
over Baseline
+17.4 %
over Baseline300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Average number of units of output
Fig. 9  Real workers respond to both leadership and incentives
Source: Antonakis et al. (2014)
Note: Average number of units of output (completed fundraising mailing let-
ters) based on different interventions. The effects of charismatic leadership 
speeches and higher incentives are statistically indistinguishable.  
Baseline High IncentivesHigh Charisma
Speech from Leader
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
–
Cost per unit of output
Fig. 10  Leadership costs less than paying workers more
Source: Antonakis et al. (2014)
Note: Cost per unit of output (completed letter for charity fundraising)  
measured in British pounds. 
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study provides real-world evidence that 
the nature of words from leaders matters 
for eliciting effort from followers.
Importantly, while the workers worked 
roughly the same amount under high 
incentives and with more charismatic 
communication from leaders, one of 
these interventions costs much less than 
the other. As figure 10 shows, paying 
workers more raised the cost per letter 
above the cost in the Baseline. However, 
the more persuasive communication from 
the leader had almost the same effect on 
effort as paying more, but at no addi-
tional cost.
Key implication #3: Effective leaders recognize the 
power of words. The words a leader uses, and how they 
are delivered, can greatly affect the extent to which 
workers exert effort in pursuit of a common goal. In 
many instances, words may have a stronger effect than 
financial incentives.
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More than words
An effective leader recognizes the power of words to motivate  
and inspire followers, using oratorical techniques like metaphors,  
contrasts, reflections of the group’s sentiments, and three-part 
lists:
“But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate − we can not 
consecrate − we can not hallow − this ground. The brave 
men, living and dead, who struggled here, have conse-
crated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The  
world will little note, nor long remember what we say  
here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us 
the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished 
work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly 
advanced.”
Abraham Lincoln (Gettysburg Address 1863)
   
  
   
“You know, where we are right now, is we’re shepherding 
some of the greatest assets in the computer industry. 
And if we want to move forward, and see Apple healthy 
and prospering again, we have to let go of a few things 
here. We have to let go of this notion that for Apple to win, 
Microsoft has to lose. We have to embrace a notion that 
for Apple to win, Apple has to do a really good job. And if 
others are going to help us, that’s great, because we need 
all the help we can get. And if we screw up and we don’t 
do a good job, it’s not somebody else’s fault. It’s our fault 
… This is about getting healthy, and this is about Apple 
being able to make incredibly great contributions to the 
industry, to get healthy and prosper again.”
Steve Jobs (Macworld Boston 1987)
         
 
“Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves 
off, and begin again the work of remaking America.”
Barack Obama (Presidential Inaugural Address 2009)
  
Adding statements like these to a speech delivered by a leader led 
to more effort in an experiment conducted with real workers.
© Alexander Gardner
© Pete Souza
© EdStock
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Ethical firms:  
The right leader matters
An important question regarding leader-
ship is what role leaders play in the ethi-
cal conduct of followers. Many examples 
come to mind of where the “wrong” 
leaders − think of Bernard Ebbers at 
WorldCom, Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth 
Lay at Enron − are believed to have 
caused or facilitated widespread unethi-
cal conduct. So, is it the case that “bad” 
leaders yield “bad” groups or firms?
Establishing a definitive answer to this 
question is not easy. The fact that a bad 
organization has a bad leader may reflect 
a relationship that goes in the other 
direction. Is it just perhaps that corpora-
tions and boards where ethics and com-
pliance are not valued highly appoint 
leaders who similarly place low value on 
moral conduct? In addition, it is likely 
that we only observe a small fraction of 
the unethical conduct that takes place in 
real businesses. Perhaps there are many 
good firms led by unethical leaders, and 
unethical firms led by good leaders, and 
we simply don’t observe enough of the 
unethical conduct to notice a relation-
ship. So, the domain of ethical conduct  
is one of the areas where it is hardest to 
establish whether leaders cause the 
behavior of those they lead.
Once again, we can turn to the power  
of controlled experiments to test whether 
such a relationship, in fact, holds. This 
growing body of evidence suggests that, 
indeed, the type of leader selected to lead 
a group − even when these leaders are 
appointed at random − can influence the 
ethical conduct of followers.13
For example, one study, conducted by 
researchers at the University of Zurich, 
investigated whether dishonest leaders 
produce groups that also act more  
dishonestly. The experiment created a  
situation in which individuals faced a 
monetary temptation to act dishonestly 
− doing so benefited both themselves and 
the group they were in. Specifically, in 
this study, subjects performed a simple 
task in which they rolled a fair six-sided 
die to determine their “performance.” 
Higher die-roll outcomes corresponded 
to higher performance. However, nobody 
except the individual rolling the die could 
observe the actual die roll, meaning that 
a participant could report any perfor-
mance level he or she wanted. The incen-
tives were such that the higher die roll 
one reported, the more money one made 
both for one’s self and for one’s group. 
More precisely, a “firm” with higher 
average reported “performance” obtained 
a higher share of the industry profits. 
Think of this reflecting a firm that can 
get ahead of its competitors by cutting 
corners and bending the rules, as when a 
manufacturing firm bribes public officials 
to obtain production permits or circum-
vent labor and safety regulations, or 
when a publicly traded company attracts 
investment by manipulating earnings 
statements.
To this situation, the experiment intro-
duced leaders, who were randomly 
appointed to groups. These leaders could 
both distribute incentives to workers, in 
the form of performance bonuses, and 
could make statements to workers − for 
example, praising either high performance 
reports or honesty. The experiment  
also included a phase that allowed the 
researchers to assess these leaders’ ten-
dencies to act honestly or dishonestly in a 
separate task. So, there was a measure − 
separate from anything the group did − 
of whether they had been randomly 
appointed an “ethical” or “unethical” 
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leader. Importantly, group members did 
not know if they had been assigned an 
ethical or unethical leader.
So, what was the effect of leaders on 
groups? The figure below shows the  
average reported performance in groups  
with “ethical” and “unethical” leaders.  
If everyone were reporting their perfor-
mance honestly, then the average report 
would be 3.5 − the expected value of  
a fair six-sided die. 
Notice that the first time that the task is 
performed, there is a bit of misreporting, 
but not much, and this is even slightly 
higher in the groups with “ethical” lead-
ers. However, over the course of the next 
10 trials, the groups led by unethical 
leaders have performance reports that 
increase at a much faster rate, rising by 
31% from the first to the last period. 
However, the groups with ethical leaders 
have performance reports that rise very 
little in the first four trials, and then rise 
slowly over the remainder of the experi-
ment. By the end of the experiment, 
groups with ethical leaders have per-
formance reports that are only 18% 
higher than where they started. How
do unethical leaders get their groups to act 
dishonestly? Both incentives and what 
leaders say provide opportunities for 
leaders to influence the behavior of fol-
lowers. Indeed, when leaders link the 
incentive bonus to workers’ reported  
performance, workers tend to report 
higher numbers. Similarly, when leaders 
make more statements encouraging 
workers to report high numbers, workers 
do so. As the graphs on the next page 
show, unethical leaders tend to employ 
both strategies more often. 
In the top panel of figure 12, we see that 
ethical leaders use the incentive bonus  
in a way that creates very little incentive 
to report high numbers − the left bar 
shows there is almost no relationship 
between the performance a worker 
reports and the size of the bonus that the 
leader gives to that worker. That is, a 
correlation near zero means there is vir-
tually no relationship between these two 
things. For unethical leaders, however, 
there is a positive relationship − unethical 
leaders give a greater share of the bonus 
to those workers who report high num-
bers. 
The bottom panel shows the relative 
share of statements made by a leader that 
encourage dishonesty. A value of 0.5  
corresponds to a leader who sends equal 
numbers of messages encouraging honesty 
and dishonesty. A value of 1 corresponds 
to a leader who only encourages dishon-
esty. We see that unethical leaders use 
more statements that encourage  
dishonesty.
Interestingly, even ethical leaders use more 
messages encouraging dishonesty than 
honesty − that is, the value for them is 
above 0.5. This largely reflects how their 
behavior changes over time and explains 
the increasing trend in reported perfor-
mance even for groups with ethical lead-
ers. Over time, even ethical leaders start 
to use more messages encouraging dis-
Note: The vertical axis is the average reported “performance”, which should 
correspond to the outcome of a fair six-sided die. Leaders were classified  
as “ethical” or “unethical” based on their honesty in a separate task, and 
were then randomly assigned to lead groups. Leaders could distribute per-
formance bonuses and make public statements to their groups. If workers 
report their performance honestly, one would expect average reported 
performance of 3.5.
Source: d’Adda, Darai and Weber (2015)
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Fig. 11 Unethical leaders produce more unethical groups
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honesty. After all, their relatively honest 
groups are repeatedly losing out to the 
dishonest groups led by unethical leaders.
The above laboratory experiment cleanly 
shows that unethical leaders − even when 
they are randomly assigned to groups 
that tend to initially be no more or less 
ethical than other groups − end up pro-
ducing groups that act more unethically. 
Of course, we again would like to know 
whether the same thing occurs outside of 
laboratory experiments. As I note above, 
it is very difficult to establish this in  
natural settings, where leaders are not 
appointed at random and where unethi-
cal conduct is often hidden from view.
Fortunately, one careful recent study 
does a nice job of showing evidence for 
this type of relationship in a natural set-
ting.14 The context of the study is the 
management of a pooled common 
resource among small groups in Ethiopia. 
As part of a publicly funded conservation 
program, each group was provided with 
an area for which they were responsible 
for cultivating and sustaining the growth 
of young trees. Resource conservation in 
this region is highly important; due to 
prior deforestation and exploitation the 
number of young trees is limited, mean-
ing that the ecosystem is under threat of 
permanent long-term damage.
To study the degree to which leaders are 
concerned with ethical behavior, the 
researchers conducted simple experi-
ments measuring leaders’ willingness to 
incur costs to punish wrongdoers. Specif-
ically, the researchers had community 
members play a simple two-person game 
in which a pair of community members 
could decide whether to act selfishly or 
help one another, by contributing money 
to a common pool that increased the 
value of contributions and benefited both 
individuals. When one person contrib-
uted money, it increased in value and 
benefited both group members. But, to 
create a tension, players also had an 
incentive not to contribute and instead 
free ride from the benefits produced by 
others’ contributions.
The critical part of this experiment, how-
ever, was a second stage in which the 
group leaders could punish community 
members for their behavior. Some leaders 
showed concerns for equality and com-
munity welfare, by punishing community 
members who contributed less than their 
counterpart or who did not contribute 
fully. Others showed concerns for equal-
ity − for example, they did not punish 
either community member if neither con-
tributed. Importantly, however, other 
group leaders used punishment anti-
socially, punishing community members 
indiscriminately − even if they contrib-
uted high amounts. The researchers vali-
Leaders’ use of performance bonus to encourage dishonesty
Fig. 12  Unethical leaders use both incentives and statements to 
 encourage dishonesty
Source: d’Adda, Darai and Weber (2015)
Note: The top graph shows the extent to which leaders link the incentive 
bonus that they can distribute to a worker’s reported “performance.”  
A value of zero indicates that leaders do not encourage workers to report 
high numbers, while a value of one indicates that leaders perfectly link  
bonuses to higher reported performance. The bottom graph shows the 
extent to which leaders use communication to encourage dishonesty by 
workers. A value of one indicates that a leader only makes statements that 
encourage reporting high numbers, while a value of zero indicates that a 
leader only makes statements that encourage honest reporting. 
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dated that those leaders they classified as 
antisocial also tended to be rated as 
worse leaders by community members.
The researchers then tested the extent to 
which leaders’ willingness to punish 
wrongdoers or to punish indiscriminately 
influenced the extent to which groups 
acted to preserve common forest 
resources. The key measure of a group’s 
ethical behavior in this setting is the 
number of young trees per hectare, 
counted several years after the onset of 
the program.
The figure on the left shows a striking 
effect of a leader’s type − measured using 
the above simple experimental game − on 
the additional young trees sustained by 
that leader’s group. In particular, relative 
to a group of baseline leaders, communi-
ties led by those leaders who valued  
community welfare obtained almost 25 
more trees per hectare, a substantial  
difference. Meanwhile, those leaders clas-
sified as antisocial led groups that sus-
tained much fewer young trees, very 
likely reflecting exploitation of natural 
resources by group members. These  
relationships are not simply explained  
by characteristics of the groups, since the 
researchers measured and separately  
controlled for characteristics of the com-
munity members. Hence, similar to  
the laboratory study above, we see that  
the degree to which a group has an  
ethical or unethical leader affects the  
ultimate ethical conduct of followers.
Key implication #4: Leaders can play a critical role in 
maintaining ethical conduct in organizations. Ethical 
leaders tend to produce groups with more ethical 
behavior, and unethical leaders tend to produce less 
ethical groups.
Source: Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015)
Note: Leaders were classified by their behavior in a simple experimental 
game that gave them the opportunity to punish community members for 
acting selfishly rather than contributing to a valuable community project. 
“Leaders who value equality” tended to punish community members who 
took advantage of one another. “Leaders who value equality and community 
welfare” also tended to punish community members who did not contribute 
to the community project. “Antisocial leaders” punished indiscriminately, 
even punishing community members who contributed.
Leaders who value 
equality
Leaders who value 
equality and 
community welfare
Antisocial leaders
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Number of additional young trees per hectare
Fig. 13 Ethical and unethical leaders affect resource conservation by 
 real-world groups
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Economists have generally ignored leader-
ship in their research, theoretical models, 
and teaching. However, as this Public 
Paper notes, this is changing. There is a 
rapidly growing body of economic studies 
that view leadership as a fundamental 
issue necessary for economists to under-
stand better. The economic approach − 
including carefully designed experiments 
that let us really identify whether leaders 
actually cause outcomes − has produced a 
better understanding of leadership, where 
it matters, and what characteristics make 
some leaders more effective than others.
For example, this work has demonstrated 
that we should often be careful in ascrib-
ing too much importance to leaders, the 
things they do, and their control over out- 
comes. When things go well or poorly, 
we naturally attribute part of it to good or 
bad leadership. But, these judgments can 
be wildly mistaken; we often credit or 
blame leaders for things that are beyond 
their control. In addition, we think that 
the selection of people for critical leader-
ship positions − such as powerful roles in 
government − is a serious process with 
great attention paid to the qualities that 
make some people better leaders than 
others. But, as it turns out, children star-
ing at photographs for a few seconds 
seem to identify much of what goes into 
these judgments. 
Putting this all together, the success or 
failure of a leader is often a haphazard 
process − full of biases and luck − and 
frequently detached from the noble traits 
that we assume are characteristic of good 
leadership. An effective leader will take 
this into account, recognizing that there 
are many things that make leaders suc-
cessful or unsuccessful, but over which he 
or she has no control.
On the other hand, there are also many 
ways in which effective leaders do influ-
ence the behavior of followers. Setting a 
good example can be an important func-
tion of leadership; but economic theory 
and experiments demonstrate that this is 
most effective when the leader has access 
to information that followers do not have. 
In such situations, leading by example 
can be particularly effective as a way  
of convincing followers of the value of 
collective effort. In fact, leaders may 
sometimes want to withhold information 
from followers, and let their actions do 
the talking, thus making both leaders and 
followers better off.
It is not surprising that leaders also influ-
ence the behavior of followers through 
the use of “hard” incentives; that is, the 
use of carrots and sticks as means to 
induce desirable behavior. This is consis-
tent with the primary role of leaders in 
much of economic theory. What is more 
surprising is the extent to which mere 
words have a similar − or, sometimes, 
even stronger − effect as financial incen-
tives. Several studies show that leaders 
exert profound influence on their follow-
ers’ behavior through what they say, even 
when they do not provide followers with 
any new information. Moreover, it is not 
just what a leader says, but how the 
leader says it. Charismatic rhetorical 
techniques like metaphors and analogies, 
rhetorical questions and three-part lists 
can enhance the degree to which a lead-
er’s words resonate with, and ultimately 
motivate, followers. While conventional 
wisdom has held for centuries that pow-
erful orators are effective leaders and 
motivators, this had not been rigorously 
tested as a mechanism for eliciting harder 
work, until very recently. Ultimately, 
words matter a great deal, and may often 
Conclusions
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be a more cost-effective means of moti-
vating effort than monetary incentives. 
These findings turn a lot of what students 
of economics typically learn about leader-
ship − that it is about contract design and 
incentives − on its head. 
Very recent research has finally estab-
lished a clear causal link between unethi-
cal leaders and the unethical behavior of 
those they lead. Despite its widespread 
intuitive appeal and much anecdotal  
evidence, no one had shown that unethi-
cal leaders actually produce unethical 
groups. Recent studies in economics − 
relying on experiments and careful ways 
of measuring individuals’ propensities to 
act unethically − have established a clear 
relationship: unethical leaders produce 
groups with more widespread unethical 
conduct. Therefore, in selecting a leader, 
issues of morality and character should 
play a prominent role.
Finally, a very exciting aspect of writing 
this Public Paper is that the research 
described here is just the tip of the ice-
berg. With a growing number of econo-
mists studying how, precisely, leaders 
affect followers and shape the groups 
and organizations they lead, much more 
stimulating and informative new evidence 
will arise. This evidence will not only 
make leadership a much more important 
part of economics training and research, 
but it will also ultimately greatly impact 
what economists can tell practitioners 
about how to lead organizations and 
societies more effectively.
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